The Purpose of Politics in Montenegro

Commentary

The Purpose of Politics in Montenegro

By Miodrag Vlahović

The regression of Montenegrin politics is evident in every aspect.

Dilettantism, petty-bourgeois mentality, and provincialism pair so neatly with crude populism and the dubious, fake degrees held by the new elite.

Six years of “liberation” have produced situations and relationships that were previously unimaginable.

Consequently, Montenegrin politics—and Montenegrin society as a whole—finds itself facing questions concerning the very survival of Montenegro.

Let us briefly consider—before the claim in the preceding sentence strikes us as exaggerated or melodramatic—a few key points, figures, and parties that currently define what politics in our country has become.

First, the “Europe Now!” Movement (PES) made a move that was—for them—logical and expected: they will not support the dismissal of Chetnik duke Mandić.

Their rationale lacks both dignity and basic logic. The promoters of the “Jasenovac Resolution”—that Greater-Serbian, Vučić-style diversion (due to which, merely by chance, some of their MPs did not end up on Croatia’s list of personae non gratae)—now claim that the “wartime past” should not hinder our path to the future!

Setting aside the petty-bourgeois, provincial rhetoric of these individuals—who, with a few marginal exceptions, are nothing more than converts or “turncoats” from the once-comfortable ruling party—the bottom line is damning: PES has no explanation for supporting a Chetnik duke, nor would their sympathizers care to hear one. Their essence lies in sinecures, public tenders, and positions of power.

Everything else is merely a “village-level issue.”

Secondly, Chetnik duke Mandić and his parties (plural!) are in charge of these “village matters.” These include the state’s insignia, the ideological and symbolic framework of our identity, the imposition of the Serbian language and a nationalist interpretation of culture, the issue of the Serbian Church, dual citizenship, and the ethno-chauvinist Greater Serbian political platform. The attitude toward war criminals and genocide is also very much a “village matter”: first, we are expected to celebrate—or at least calmly observe—that repulsive orgy of hate. And yet, our “European” chetnik Mandić and his “three-fingers” ministers claim that the genocide never even happened.

That is why Mandić speaks of national reconciliation while simultaneously and brutally trampling upon every element of Montenegrin identity and statehood. He has even subordinated NATO membership to cheap, mythological Greater Serbian tropes.

Mandić tramples upon Montenegro and the Montenegrins while calling for peace—that is, for a peaceful surrender.

Mandić’s “conflict” with Vučić has recently been laid bare, specifically in the wake of a war criminal’s death. We now know—so as not to waste time—that the differences between the two are merely stylistic and politically ephemeral; they differ no more than do their respective statements of condolence and the accompanying rationales.

Thirdly, the Bosniak Party and the Albanian coalition parties are, in fact, an inevitable and necessary part of such a political landscape.

The primary issue is that Ibrahimović and Gjeloshaj are pursuing an agenda of ethno-federalization for Montenegro. Nationalists always speak on behalf of the “entire nation”, meaning that a pact uniting “all” Serbs, “all” Bosniaks, and “all” Albanians serves to dismantle and destroy the values ​​of a civic society—and to marginalize and eliminate Montenegrins from political and public life.

The complicity of the Bosniak Party and certain Albanian parties with Serbian nationalism is, at its core, deeply anti-Montenegrin—in every sense of the word, from the national to the state level.

This means nothing to Ibrahimović and his team—whose appetite for positions and money has grown, and who were driven to announce a vote for Mandić’s dismissal solely by calls, warnings, and public expectations from influential quarters (the Mothers of Srebrenica, the Islamic Community, and Bosniak intellectuals from the country and the region)—all while knowing full well that nothing will come of recalling the Chetnik duke or jeopardizing their own ministerial posts and other sinecures.

At the same time, the leadership of the Bosniak Party does not shy away from even the most drastic measures to stifle criticism—something recently experienced firsthand by Dr. Šerbo Rastoder, a founding figure of the Bosniak idea in Montenegro. He, too, is now considered an “enemy of the Bosniaks.”

Fourth, but by no means least, the opposition DPS and the European Alliance—regardless of their past inertia and passivity at key moments over the last six years—face a very clear political landscape.

Waiting for a pact with Spajić’s PES is a futile endeavor. “Preserving” Ibrahimović’s leadership of the Bosniak Party is even more so.

Both the largest party and the coalition of three smaller parties need a new impetus and a platform for conducting policy—both domestically and abroad, at European venues—that is clear, consistent, and decisive, free from hedging and compromise.

Recent events have highlighted this need and demonstrated that a “wait-and-see” tactic is detrimental—both for these parties and for Montenegro.

The 2027 elections offer an opportunity not merely to “preserve the voter base,” but to expand influence through a new political approach and—instead of speculating about the European Alliance potentially joining the current ruling coalition—to run a campaign grounded in civic, European, democratic, and Montenegrin values.

It is either that, or serving as mere set and window dressing for the “European” politics of the Chetnik duke and his cronies from PES.