When the Pumpkins Bloomed, Again

Commentary

When the Pumpkins Bloomed, Again

By Miodrag Vlahović

Conflict within the “Serbian” bloc was inevitable.

“Small pond, too many crocodiles!” my late friend Boban Rakčević used to say.

The sixth year of August has fully laid bare an open secret: Serbia played a role in shaping the government in Montenegro following the clerical (processions-led) populist counter-revolution—which it had also significantly supported logistically. Even the participants in monastery conspiracies and personnel-selection meetings—those key political institutions of the new era—now admit to this.

The forced and orchestrated unity of (Greater) Serbian nationalists has come to an end; the boil has finally burst.

Witnesses and observers are expected to frame this confrontation in historical terms: it is not merely a case of one of Serbia’s pawns or lackeys attacking another; rather, Montenegro’s European agenda is at stake!

Thus, on the ostensibly pro-European side, we find the opportunists of PES and the zealots of Mandić’s NSD.

Time is running out for the former. Signs of discord and disintegration are already appearing within the party that a disgruntled Spajić fails to control (or lacks the skill to do so).

His tenure wiil last only until the elections. Afterward, he will vanish from Montenegro’s political scene: within the ranks of the motley PES, there are more cooperative lackeys who are closer to the Church of Serbia.

The latter group is on the rise: European-sounding rhetoric masks Mandić’s agenda of Serbianizing Montenegro. Commissioner Kos—pardonez nous— embraces him, while Ambassador Sattler chimes in with support.

The Chetnik duke is far more experienced than the rest of the ruling establishment. He is making a grab for absolute power—whether as head of state or head of government, no difference.

For the audience—which includes Montenegro’s civic opposition—there remains an imposed and contrived “dilemma”: is Mandić’s conflict with Vučić genuine, or is this merely a (new) performance staged for the traditionally confused and politically disoriented Montenegrins?

Should we help the Chetnik duke and his “national reconciliation”? Or defend Spajić’s propagandistic European charade?

(Incidentally, both are citizens of Serbia. That is to say, Spajić was one, until the Serbian authorities helped him swiftly shed that distinction. Before that, he used to boast about his Serbian passport to everyone, including paid consultants from Serbia. Mandić has long publicly prided himself on his Serbian citizenship.)

In either scenario—whether the conflict with Vučić is real or manufactured—the question has another, more important side: who will Mandić align with after the election? With the same political structures as now?

That would be extremely difficult to orchestrate. If that is indeed his intention, he would need at least one of the two Montenegrin political factions.

The DPS has opted to wait and focus its campaign on economic and social issues. The largest party is also counting on support from certain Serb-aligned groups, primarily the one in Budva.

Will the disintegration of PES happen fast enough for that static tactic? Could Spajić be completely discredited by the summer of 2027, and the DPS become acceptable again—even to Western partners?

We could ask about that government’s program if, by some miracle, it were actually formed… Or about the idea of ​​winning a majority in the elections—right now. Isn’t that the best option—pursuing a policy aimed at winning elections, rather than one designed to make you a more suitable coalition partner?

And what, on the other hand, would ES entering the government actually mean? That the DPS and Vučić’s DNP would remain in the opposition? Would that guarantee Montenegro’s European future? Who could possibly believe that? Or justify it, for that matter?

Mandić certainly needs to be asked whether he is prepared—within the framework of his “reconciliation” and “new Serbian response”—to form a coalition with the DPS and ES. That is the key question to resolve that “dilemma”. There is no need to wait until next summer—that question is ready to be asked today. That is the “new Serbian policy” we are interested in.

Let us imagine a response from Mandić that could wipe away everything he has done and said over the years—including the last two or three—while he sits with the Serbian flag behind him and the Banovina of Zeta building in front, acting on behalf of the “Serb constituent people”!

Instead, in all likelihood, we will witness a controlled contest: who is the greater and better Serb, who is the true believer and friend of the Church of Serbia’s clergy, who is closer to Serbian intelligence agencies and media, who betrayed or defended “Serbdom,” and who is the true follower of Risto Radović and other such role models… These topics constitute the sole area of ​​expertise for the August politicians.

They calculate that these are the most important parameters of the political game in Montenegro—both now and in the future.

An inert (or significantly slowed and controlled) opposition actually aids them in this, persistently waiting for the government to fall on its own.

Meanwhile, Mandić calls the shots—seizing the opportunity to wrest power from the incompetent PES, both before and outside of elections. And he even defends a “Serb Montenegro” against Vučić!

Montenegro’s pumpkins continue to bloom. Waiting.