
Diplomatic Post
Zelenskyy in Belgrade
By Miodrag Vlahović
Serbia does not officially export ammunition to Ukraine, although experts monitoring the situation cite shipment values of at least 800 million euros—dating back to 2022—specifically involving 122mm and 152mm artillery ammunition. These calibers follow the old Soviet standard, and production capacities for them exist in both Serbia and Bulgaria—the latter also supplying ammunition to Ukraine via third countries (just like Serbia).
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s visit to Belgrade went almost unnoticed in the Serbian press. Vučić’s interest in minimizing potential fallout with Russia was accommodated by the strictly controlled media.
To his dismay, however, it was impossible to keep Zelenskyy’s visit hidden from the public eye: Putin had already issued a statement calling for support for “patriotically oriented” students in Belgrade.
The motive behind that statement is clear: Serbian patriotism has long been measured by loyalty to Russia. Whoever is not obedient to the Kremlin is not a Serbian patriot.
“ … CHEASE FOR MONEY”
Zelenskyy and Vučić could not agree on Serbia’s refusal to join the sanctions against Russia.
Nor could the two presidents find common ground regarding the EU and NATO. While one country has been heroically resisting Russian aggression—along with the gravest atrocities and destruction—for four and a half years, hoping for a chance to soon join the EU and—in a future that may be much closer than it seems—become a NATO member, the other represents the greatest obstacle to completing European and Atlantic integration processes in the Western Balkans; meanwhile, its European agenda has rightly been halted, and—driven by the obstinacy of the worst nationalists—it rejects even the very idea of ever becoming a member of the Alliance.
That is why Zelenskyy’s visit is primarily—if not exclusively—linked to the delivery of ammunition, military equipment, and spare parts for MiG-29s. A defensive war must be won.
Politics and other areas of cooperation took a back seat, even though Western media reported on signed agreements to support Serbia’s agricultural sector and for Serbia to participate in the reconstruction of a devastated Ukrainian city. Ukraine is certainly interested in continuing cooperation with the region through the Ukraine–Southeast Europe summits—held since 2023—as well as through the so-called Carpathian Initiative, scheduled for the autumn.
Zelenskyy’s statement regarding territorial integrity—which drew a very negative reaction in Pristina and Tirana—was met with great satisfaction and approval by the hosts; however, its impact on the Serbian public was muted by the fact that the visit received almost no media coverage.
Zelenskyy thus said what the hosts wanted to hear—because, while the war rages, ammunition and military equipment matter more than the otherwise untenable and false comparison between Kosovo and Crimea—not to mention eastern Ukraine, which is a victim of Russian aggression.
Analysts are now assessing whether—and to what extent—Vučić has “redeemed” himself in the eyes of the EU through this visit, given all the destruction he has caused on both the domestic and foreign fronts. Yet, this narrative inevitably circles back to the sale of ammunition and war supplies—a practice ongoing since the onset of Russian aggression. Vučić can continue to “balance” in a situation where he can rely on the trust of neither the West nor the East—at least as long as he has ammunition to sell. Or until a confluence of circumstances brings “new” Serbian “patriots” to power. (As for the scenario of Putin leaving the political stage before Vučić—and what that would mean for Serbia—that is a topic for another time.)
The willingness to turn a blind eye to Vučić’s actions—at least since 2022—has been predicated precisely on these transactions (which, as far as is known, are conducted indirectly via various companies in the Czechia and Poland), so there are no surprises on that front either. It is highly likely that Vučić bases his policy on this, counting on leniency and a certain inertia among Western partners—an approach that nonetheless has its limits, as recently demonstrated when Commissioner Kos’s optimistic plan to open a third negotiating “cluster” with Serbia ended in a fiasco, blocked by no fewer than eight EU member states …
No one commented on the fact that President Zelenskyy did not visit Montenegro. The current authorities in Montenegro—enamored with the Trump-Putin dynamic and ideologically and culturally oriented toward Moscow (not to mention their “sincere” love for NATO, for the moment)—would have had nothing to say to the Ukrainian guest other than a string of empty platitudes.
Platitudes that neither they themselves nor the Ukrainians believe in …
CEUTA, ON ITALY’S BORDER
Events unfolding on that Spanish enclave in the Maghreb—on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco—have shaken European unity beyond all measure and reason.
In a well-orchestrated “invasion” of migrants, around sixty thousand Moroccans surged into the territory; nearly a hundred people died, and—according to news agency reports—over 48,000 of them voluntarily returned to Moroccan soil within the first few days.
Leading the response from EU nations was—somewhat surprisingly—the President of Italian Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni.
The Italian Prime Minister immediately ordered the suspension of the Schengen regime with Spain—as if Ceuta were right on Italy’s own border—which provoked an understandable reaction from Madrid.
After a brief pause, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez introduced reciprocal measures against Italy. Consequently, full passport checks are now being conducted at airport crossings between the two countries, as if the Maastricht Treaty did not exist.
Beyond that specific situation, several aspects should concern us too—those of us in the EU’s “suburbs”:
First, the events in Ceuta demonstrate just how easy it is to trigger such a dramatic situation, provided there is sufficient interest and incentive. Was this a “demonstration” by Morocco, or perhaps a deal with anti-European nationalists and proponents of “sovereignty” from both sides of the Atlantic?
Second, the EU’s reactions were negative and panicked, lacking even basic solidarity—creating a very poor impression regarding the level of European unity, and not just concerning the issue of illegal immigration.
Third, Italy’s reaction could also be interpreted as an attempt to score domestic political points—since politics in that country, especially over the last decade, revolves around the issue of immigration, accompanied by heightened tensions and accusations between the center-left and center-right (as Italians term them). Regardless, however, this artificial and forced conflict with Spain demonstrates that right-wing national agendas (whether national, nationalist, or “sovereignist”) pose a serious and constant threat to EU unity; this has repercussions for all segments of European policy—including our own (anticipated) accession to the family of European nations and states.
Fourth—and this should not be overlooked—no one can deny or sweep under the rug the problem of immigration from Africa and the Middle East. Yet, there are varying policy approaches to this issue. Poland and Hungary held a clear stance: zero immigrants from distant regions—partly because they were not the intended destinations for these people.
Montenegro has, at least for the time being, been spared the wave of refugees; consequently, the two existing reception centers (Božaj and Spuž) have sufficed to organize their care and onward transit to their final destinations.
A single—and by all appearances offhand—remark by Ms. Meloni regarding the need for Montenegro to also set up migrant reception centers prompted an immediate reaction from Prime Minister Spajić (who, incidentally, holds peculiar criteria regarding what constitutes a “parochial issue” unworthy of attention)—a reaction that, unfortunately, inspires neither confidence nor a sense of security.
It was—as is readily apparent—aimed at political allies and supporters of PES and the ruling establishment; an audience among whom it is easy to garner support for a panic-driven stance toward immigrants hailing from distant lands, possessing different religious beliefs and skin colors.
One would expect such zeal and serious engagement from the Prime Minister regarding the issue of so-called dual citizenship as well—a matter that poses a far greater tangible risk to Montenegro.
However, for a party whose officials hold the reactions and positions of the Church of Serbia in awe—and which describes Germany’s AfD as a “polished civic party” (?!)—it is far more agreeable to battle—as yet—imaginary problems than to confront real risks and the destructive, dangerous agendas of its own coalition partners.
CARGO FROM ANKARA
The story of the tragicomic concealment of President Trump inside an aircraft supply container—during his departure from the NATO summit in Ankara—has made headlines around the world.
It is beneath any standard—even the low bar to which American politics has sunk under the corrupt MAGA regime—for a head of state (of any nation, let alone the planet’s most powerful military force) to be secretly transferred from one aircraft to another. This was done in such a way that even his closest aides, the flight crew, officials, and journalists were unaware that they were flying under (alleged) Iranian threats to attack “Air Force One”—which was flying without the President on board—while Donald Trump traveled on a different plane.
It was later revealed that Secretary of State Marco Rubio knew the President was not on the same flight—a fact that speaks volumes about his immense “courage,” or perhaps his immense fear. Either way, the implication is the same.
The Trump administration continues to tear the United States apart at a pace and in a manner unparalleled in American history.
The war against Iran has long been at a dead end. The military intervention is a fiasco. The Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed; that is to say, its navigability depends more on Iran than on the mighty USA, whose incompetent “Secretary of War” is struggling to secure sufficient quantities of ammunition—specifically, the missiles and projectiles he hastily and unnecessarily expended during the first few weeks of the attack on Iran.
The economic consequences of such an adventurist (and, unfortunately, self-destructive) policy pursued by the Trump 47 administration are now being felt by US citizens and the entire world alike.
Whether this situation will persist beyond the congressional midterm elections remains to be seen in October and November. Impeachment is an option—provided, of course, that democratic institutions in the US are still functioning.
Thus, at least until then, we will witness one of the ugliest and most agonizing periods in American history. Where Trump is concerned, that is a dangerously long time.
To America’s friends across the globe, the entire situation appears particularly dramatic and painful. Let us hope—not for long!•
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